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RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR HOLPER’S ARTICLE, REDEFINING
“PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIMES” IN REFUGEE LAW
Fatma Marouf*
An individual who faces a significant risk of persecution in her home
country is barred from asylum in the United States if she is convicted of
a “particularly serious crime” (“PSC”). Despite the grave consequences
of such a conviction, there is relatively little scholarship exploring how a
PSC should be defined. The term, which comes from the UN Refugee
Convention, was incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act
in 1980. 1
Professor Holper’s article, Redefining “Particularly Serious Crimes”
in Refugee Law, makes an important contribution to the literature by
showing how the historical trajectory of the PSC definition mirrors the
“severity revolution” of the 1980s and 1990s in the criminal justice
system. 2 She also explains that the federal Bail Reform Act (BRA)
creates rebuttable presumptions of dangerousness for certain types of
offenses—not just crimes of violence, but also drug trafficking and
offenses involving minor victims, including possession of child
pornography—that are now treated as PSCs in immigration cases. 3
Professor Holper persuasively argues that immigration law has gone
astray by following in the footsteps of the severity revolution, which
many agree has failed. Because an individual’s life is at stake in cases
involving refugee protection, Professor Holper contends that PSC
determinations should be narrower than classifications of dangerousness
under federal bail law. She proposes dropping offenses like drug
trafficking and child pornography from the PSC definition and limiting
this categorization to violent crimes against persons with a significant
sentence of at least five years.
This response seeks to develop the discussion in two ways. First, it
addresses Professor Holper’s argument that the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) has expressed “mistrust” of criminal law judges by
minimizing the importance of the length of a sentence in the PSC
determination. I argue that the relationship between the immigration and
criminal systems is complicated and cannot easily be categorized as one
of trust or mistrust. I then address Professor Holper’s proposal and
compare it to a proposal that I made recently in an article arguing that the
PSC analysis should follow the categorical approach to analyzing
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1. Mary Holper, Redefining “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 1093, 1100 (2017).
2. Id. at 1125–26.
3. Id. at 1130–31.
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convictions. 4
“IT’S COMPLICATED”: TRUST ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Professor Holper points out several ways that the immigration system
“mistrusts” the criminal justice system, including the BIA’s directive that
little weight should be given to the length of a sentence for purposes of a
PSC determination. Other examples noted by Professor Holper are the
INA’s definition of a “conviction,” which ignores whether a sentence was
suspended and whether a conviction was expunged or vacated for
immigration purposes; the factors considered for release on bond, which
minimize an immigrant’s early release from prison or low bond in related
criminal proceedings; and Congress’s elimination of the Judicial
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) in 1990, which allowed a
sentencing judge in the criminal case to recommend against deportation.
At the same time, however, the immigration system gives substantial
deference to the criminal justice system. For example, by focusing on the
elements of the statute of conviction as the initial step in the PSC analysis,
the BIA allows the criminal process to determine whether an offense
comes “within the ambit” of a PSC. 5 Only after this initial determination
is made are immigration judges supposed to look at other reliable
information in deciding whether a conviction is a PSC. 6 As Professor
Holper recognizes, the BIA’s shift towards focusing on categories of
crimes rather than an individualized analysis reflects the severity
revolution. 7
Some of the BIA’s decisions addressing the PSC analysis even give
excessive deference to the criminal process. In Matter of G-G-S-, for
instance, the BIA prohibited immigration judges from considering an
individual’s mental health at the time of an offense for purposes of the
PSC determination, reasoning that the criminal judge had already taken
the mental health into account as part of the conviction and sentencing. 8
But that reasoning is flawed. 9 There are many reasons why a defendant’s
mental health may never be taken into consideration in the criminal
proceedings: the offense may be a strict liability crime; the defendant may
be reluctant to raise an insanity defense for fear of getting a longer
sentence if the defense is unsuccessful; and a sentencing judge may
decide not to consider mental health in sentencing as a matter of
4. Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the Categorical Approach, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 1427, 1429 (2017).
5. Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007).
6. Id.
7. Holper, supra note 1, at 1128.
8. Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 345 (BIA 2014).
9. Fatma E. Marouf, Assume Sane, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 25, 25 (2015)
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discretion. 10 By assuming that the criminal court’s decision fully
accounted for any mental health conditions, the BIA relies too heavily on
the criminal process.
These examples suggest that the relationship between the immigration
system and the criminal justice system may be more complicated than
“mistrustful,” reflecting great deference towards criminal law judges in
some areas and deviation in others. Indeed, the immigration system has
adopted some of the more severe aspects of the criminal justice system,
such as the focus on categories of offenses rather than individualized
facts, while rejecting mitigating factors that the criminal justice system
takes into account, such as evidence of remorse and rehabilitation, as well
as any lenience in sentencing.
Professor Holper’s concerns about the BIA’s refusal to take sentence
length into consideration are valid; but we should also be cautious about
what it means to “trust” the criminal justice system. The primary concern
involves failure to consider a short sentence a sign that a conviction is not
that serious. But the opposite and potentially problematic flipside is
assuming that long sentences connote dangerousness.
In FY 2016, the average sentence length for offenders who received
relief from mandatory minimum sentences in the federal system was 67
months, over five years. 11 For those subjected to mandatory minimums,
the average sentence was 138 months, over 10 years. 12 Looking
specifically at noncitizens, the figures are similar, with average sentences
of 66 months for those relieved of mandatory minimums and 124 months
for those subjected to mandatory minimum. 13 In 2017, 30% of federal
defendants received a sentence of over five years. 14 These statistics
suggest that even limiting PSCs to offenses with a sentence of at least
five years will have severe consequences for many noncitizens.
Under the Trump Administration, sentences will likely become even
longer, since Attorney General Sessions is reversing important policies
adopted by the Justice Department under the Obama Administration to
reduce sentences, especially for lower level drug-related crimes. 15 In May
2017, Attorney General Sessions issued a memorandum instructing
prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable

10. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged these factors in a recent decision that rejected Matter
of G-G-S-. See Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 985, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2018).
11. Vera Institute of Justice, An Overview of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal
Criminal Justice System (Sections 4 and 5), 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 34, 47 (2017).
12. Id. at 47.
13. Id. at 49.
14. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 2017 (June
2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
15. Id. at 8.
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offense.” 16 Now, if prosecutors want to pursue lesser charges for crimes
that carry mandatory minimum sentences, they will need a supervisor’s
approval to make an exception. To the extent these changes primarily
affect drug-related offenses, they would not impact Professor Holper’s
proposal, which excludes those offenses altogether. But the second
largest category of crimes that involve mandatory minimum are firearms
offenses, which would likely be considered “violent crimes.” 17
Because the BIA is part of the Department of Justice, headed by the
Attorney General and subject to political influence, it is quite possible
that future cases addressing PSCs will reflect new law enforcement
priorities. 18 The Attorney General can also directly intervene in
immigration matters by certifying cases pending before the BIA to
himself and singlehandedly make major changes in legal doctrine. 19 Just
as AG Sessions recently overruled the only BIA precedent granting
asylum based on domestic violence in Matter of A-B-, he may well decide
to define new types of crimes as presumptively PSCs. 20 This is precisely
how drug trafficking offenses became presumptively PSCs under
Attorney General Ashcroft during the Bush Administration.
HOW SHOULD A PSC BE DEFINED?
Professor Holper proposes that discretionary determinations about
whether an offense is a PSC should be limited to violent crimes (i.e.
crimes involving actual or threatened physical injury to another person)
with a significant sentence, which she defines as at least five years. This
proposal has several strengths. It provides a bright line rule for
determining whether a conviction is a PSC. The proposal also avoids
subjective interpretations by judges, makes it easier for defendants to
predict whether an offense will be considered a PSC before taking a guilty
plea, and increases the efficiency of immigration courts by making the
PSC analysis simpler.
However, the proposal appears to include only a subset of crimes that
already comes within the statutory definition of a PSC. The INA defines
a PSC to include all aggravated felonies (as defined by the INA) for
purposes of asylum, 21 and an aggravated felony or aggravated felonies
with an aggregate sentence of at least five years for purposes of
16. Memorandum from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to all federal prosecutors,
“Department
Charging
and
Sentencing
Policy”
(May
10,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download.
17. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 14, at 34–35.
18. The Attorney General is authorized to determine the BIA’s jurisdiction, as well as to
appoint and remove members of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(a)(1)–(2), (d).
19. 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(h).
20. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 520 (AG 2018).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
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withholding of removal. 22 Any “crime of violence” with a sentence of at
least one year is an aggravated felony under the INA. 23 The definition of
a “crime of violence” in the INA encompasses “violent crimes” as
defined by the proposal. 24 A violent crime with a sentence of five years
would therefore automatically qualify as a PSC under the statute for
purposes of both asylum and withholding of removal. Consequently,
adopting the proposal would eliminate any truly discretionary aspect of
the PSC determination.
The Attorney General (or BIA) could decide to limit PSCs to offenses
defined by statute, but any narrower definition would require Congress
to revise the statute. Since Professor Holper does not suggest amending
the statute, leaving a truly discretionary category in place would require
slightly modifying her proposal. This could be done by dropping the
requirement of a “significant sentence,” or simply by not defining a
“significant sentence” as at least five years.
The proposal I make in my article titled A Particularly Serious
Exception to the Categorical Approach shares some aspects of Professor
Holper’s proposal but argues that the word “convicted” in the statutory
phrase “convicted of a particularly serious crime” requires application of
the categorical approach under recent Supreme Court precedents. 25 The
categorical approach involves looking to the elements of the statute of
conviction and comparing them to the relevant INA provision. 26 If the
statute of conviction is broader than the INA provision, then the
conviction may not “count” under the INA. When a statute is divisible,
the record of conviction may also be considered, which is limited to the
charging document, any jury instructions, the plea agreement or judgment
of conviction, and the sentence. 27 The categorical approach prevents
immigration judges from getting into the facts underlying a conviction.
In order for courts to apply the categorical approach to the PSC
analysis, the elements of a PSC must be clearly defined. The first element
that I proposed is that the offense must be a violent crime, defined in
much the same way as Professor Holper proposes (I described it as the
first part of the “crime of violence” definition but limited to crimes
against persons). 28 The second element that I proposed was the use of a
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 16).
24. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
25. Marouf, supra note 4, at 1432–47. See also Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,
2279 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200 (2013) (“[T]he relevant INA provisions
ask what the noncitizen was ‘convicted of,’ not what he did, and the inquiry in immigration
proceedings is limited accordingly.”); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 579–80 (2010)
(focusing on the importance of the conviction as “the relevant statutory hook”).
26. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190.
27. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281, 2285.
28. Marouf, supra note 4, at 1471.
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dangerous weapon likely to produce serious bodily harm or death, which
further narrows the types of crimes to the gravest and most dangerous
offenses. 29 The third element I proposed is intent, which would eliminate
crimes requiring only negligence or recklessness. 30 I argued that this
element helps satisfy the principle of proportionality, so that a person is
not intentionally exposed to a risk of persecution based on a reckless or
negligent injury to someone else. Finally, I argued that PSCs should be
limited to felonies, since it would be illogical for a misdemeanor to be
deemed “particularly serious” given the existence of the more serious
category of felonies. Limiting PSCs to felonies also helps eliminate
crimes with shorter sentences without specifying the sentence.
If Professor Holper’s requirement of a “violent crime” is based solely
on the elements of the statute of conviction, rather than the underlying
facts, then both her proposal and my own avoid any individualized
assessment of the facts. Although in some cases excluding the facts may
hurt the immigrant, it often helps level the playing field in a system where
approximately 40% of immigrants are unrepresented and unable to
introduce factual evidence in support of their cases. In addition, relying
only on the statutory elements and record of conviction promotes
uniformity by avoiding highly subjective decisions by immigration
judges about which offense are particularly serious and increases the
efficiency of the entire determination process.
One of the most important benefits of focusing on the elements and
the record of conviction is that it allows immigrants and their criminal
defense attorneys to predict the consequences of a conviction when they
take a guilty plea, which is how over 90% of criminal charges are
resolved. 31 Given that the Supreme Court has held it may be ineffective
of counsel for a criminal defense attorney not to advise a defendant about
the immigration consequences of a conviction, predictability is critical
not only for the immigrant, but also for counsel. 32 It should be noted,
however, that incorporating the sentence into the definition of a PSC
undercuts predictability. Even if the prosecutor and defendant stipulate to
a sentence in a plea agreement, the agreement is not binding on the judge,
who may impose a longer sentence after receiving the guilty plea.
Of course, not making an individualized, fact-based assessment of
whether an offense is a PSC also has drawbacks. Offender characteristics,
29. Id. at 1472.
30. Id.
31. Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 243777, State
Court Processing Statistics, 2006: Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009, at 22, 24
tbl.21 (2013), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf. In the federal courts, 97 percent of
felony convictions follow guilty pleas. See Mark Motivans, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 234184, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009, at 12 tbl.9 (2011),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
32. Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 356, 374 (2009).
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including mental illness, evidence of rehabilitation, and any other
mitigating factors would not be considered. But, as noted above, they are
not considered now, either. Not making individualized determinations is
also at odds with the approach embraced by the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, the international authority in charge of interpreting the
Refugee Convention. Ignoring the facts would further conflict with the
case law of some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, which handles over
half of all the immigration appeals in the country and has interpreted the
INA to mean that the agency must make individualized PSC
determinations for any offenses that fall outside the category established
by Congress for purposes of withholding of removal.
Still, given the mess that the BIA has made of the PSC case law,
resulting in arbitrary and unpredictable decisions about whether or not a
conviction will lead to someone being deported to her death, sticking with
the elements of an offense and the record of conviction is a reasonable
approach. In this respect, Professor Holper’s proposal and mine are more
alike than they may initially seem. They both promote consistency and
predictability by making violent crimes the heart of the PSC analysis and
avoiding fact-based determinations.

